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HAS DRETSKE REALLY REFUTED SKEPTICISM? 
Charles J. Abate 
In this paper. I want to examine a particular chal-
lenge to skepticism which seems to be gaining some degree 
of popularity in current philosophical literature,1 and 
which, I believe, fails to establish its case against 
skepticism in virtue of its trading on a crucial ambiguity. 
Suppose Ivan claims to know the following: 
(1) The wall of my office is beige. 
Now, in order to cast doubt on Ivan's claim to know (1), 
a skeptic might point out that (1) entails the following 
proposition: 
(2) The wall of my office is not white, and cleverly 
illuminated to appear beige. 
The skeptic could argue, at this point, that Ivan cannot 
be certain that the wall of his office is not white, and 
cleverly illuminated to look beige (or at least, that 
Ivan has taken no special precautions to insure that it 
is not), so for all Ivan knows, (2) might be false. But 
(2) is entailed by (1), so if (2) might be false, then 
(1) might also be false. And in that case, assuming 
that Ivan is aware that (1) entails (2) , Ivan would be 
quite presumptuous in claiming to know (1). 
This sort of skeptical argument might be advanced 
in order to raise doubts about Ivan's claim to know (1) , 
and the intent of such an argument might be to raise 
sufficient doubt to cause Ivan to withdraw his cliam 
to know (1). However, we are not especially concerned 
here with what a person claims to know, for what a 
given individual claims to know on some particular oc-
casion might depend upon factors which are irrelevant 
to our present concerns. (For example, a person's 
knowledge claims might be affected by such factors as 
whether or not he is drunk, whether he has wagered a 
great sum of money on his claim, whether his life depends 
upon the truth of his claim, and so on.) In what follows, 
then, we shall be interested solely in what a person does 
(or does not) know, regardless of what he might claim in 
a given situation. 
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Let us, therefore, consider another example. Sup-
pose Ivan claims to know the following: 
(3) The tomato on my table is red. 
Again, a skeptic might point out that (3) entails the 
following proposition: 
(4) The object on my table is a tomato, and not an 
imitation, very cleverly disguised to look like 
a tomato. 
The skeptic can then proceed to argue that Ivan does not, 
in normal circumstances (or perhaps in any circumstances), 
know (4), for Ivan presumably lacks adequate evidence for 
the truth of (4); but since (3) entails (4)—again, 
assuming that Ivan knows that this entailment h o l d s — 
Ivan cannot know (3) without knowing (4). Hence, Ivan 
does not know (3). 
In response to this sort of skeptical argument, 
Dretske 2 (and others, 3 following Dretske's line of 
argument) has attempted to short-circuit the conclusion 
of the skeptic's argument by denying one of its premises 
— t h e principle of demonstration. That is, Dretske claims 
that although (3) entails (4) , a person could know (3) , 
and know that (3) entails (4)> yet fail to know (4). 
This is so, presumably, because (4) is simply a presup-
position of (3), and one's knowing (4) may be quite 
irrelevant to one's justification for knowing (3). 
Dretske offers a number of examples purporting to 
show that (what I have called) the principle of demonstra-
tion is not a necessary condition for justifying what one 
knows. In each example, Dretske argues that someone can 
know a given proposition, and know that this proposition 
entails a second proposition, yet fail to know the 
second proposition. I intend to argue that all of 
Dretske's examples are suspect, and each for the same 
reason: each trades on an ambiguity whose clarifica-
tion casts doubt on the validity of Dretske's argument. 
In each of Dretske's examples, it is the first 
proposition (that someone supposedly knows) which is 
problematic. In the last example which we have cited, 
(3) is such a proposition. If it seems obvious that the 
meaning of (3) is clear, let me point out what I take to 
be the crucial ambiguity. 
It is not, in this case, at all clear what sort of 
linguistic function is intended to characterize the 
definite description in (3). I have in mind here Donnel-
lan's distinction between the referential use, and the 
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attributive use, of definite descriptions. 1 1 Depending 
upon whether the definite description in (3) is used 
referringly or attributively, different sorts of justi-
fication will be required for one's knowing (3) . Hence, 
whether one's knowing (3) requires one's knowing (4) 
remains unclear. The difficulty, moreover, takes on the 
form of a dilemma: If, on the one hand, the description 
in (3) is used attributively, then (3) clearly entails 
(4), but the principle of demonstration holds; if, on 
the other hand, the description in (3) is used referring-
ly, then the principle of demonstration fails to hold, 
but only because (3) no longer entails (4), and thus 
the example is irrelevant to the principle of demonstra-
tion. 
The ambiguity of (3) can be equally illustrated in 
terms of the de re / de dicto distinction, (and drawing 
out the ambiguity of propositions like (3) in these terms 
will apply even to propositions containing no definite 
descriptions). In the example under consideration, it 
is not clear whether Ivan's knowing (3) amounts to de_ re_ 
or de dicto knowledge. Thus: 
(5) The x on Ivan's table is a tomato, and (Ivan 
knows that x is red); 
(6) Ivan knows that (the x on his table is a tomato, 
and x is red) . 
Once again, the difficulty here takes the form of a 
dilemma: If, on the one hand, Ivan's knowing (3) amounts 
to de dicto knowledge, then (3) entails (4), but the 
principle of demonstration holds; if, on the other hand, 
Ivan's knowing (3) amounts to de re knowledge, then the 
principle of demonstration fails to hold, but only because 
(3) no longer entails (4), and thus the example is ir-
relevant to the principle of demonstration. 
Now, it could be argued that Dretske succeeds in 
refuting at least one sort of skeptic, viz., the skeptic 
who holds that nothing can be known; for on Dretske's 
account, many things can be known, in spite of the dif-
ficulties which he encounters in denying the principle 
of demonstration. In response to such a suggestion, I 
have three comments: First, it is not clear that there 
are any such radical skeptics, and if not, then a refuta-
tion of such skepticism would be a straw-man argument. 
Second, even if there were such radical skeptics, one 
would not need to deny the principle of demonstration, 
as Dretske does, in order to effect a refutation of such 
skepticism. And finally, the sort of skeptic who is apt 
to appeal to the principle of demonstration to strengthen 
his challenge is not a skeptic who holds that all knowl-
edge is impossible, but more likely a skeptic who argues 
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that we can have no perceptual knowledge, or a skeptic 
who argues that we can have no knowledge of an external 
world. 
In what follows, I shall consider a skeptic—call 
him Doubting Thomas—who denies the possibility of 
knowledge of an external world, and I shall try to in-
dicate how he uses the principle of demonstration to 
strengthen his challenge. I do not want to suggest 
that such skepticism is unassailable, but I shall argue 
that Dretske's line of argument has no force whatever 
against such a skeptic. That is, whatever may be wrong 
about Doubting Thomas' argument is untouched by the sort 
of attack levelled by Dretske. 
Let us, then, consider one of Doubting Thomas' 
typical arguments. Suppose Ivan claims to know the 
following: 
(7) Some tables are brown. 
This proposition, Thomas asserts, entails: 
(8) Some tables exist. 
Assuming that Ivan knows that (7) entails (8), Thomas 
argues that Ivan cannot know (7) unless he knows (8) , 
and further, that Ivan cannot know ( 8 ) . 5 Hence, Ivan 
cannot know (7). 
Now, in accordance with Dretske's line of argument, 
someone could attempt to short-circuit this skeptical 
challenge by arguing that Ivan can indeed know (7), and 
know that (7) entails (8), yet fail to know (8) .6 This 
would be possible, presumably, because one's knowing (8) 
is irrelevant to the justification for one's knowing (7) 
Or is it? 
Consider proposition (7). Like the previous cases 
we have examined, (7) is plagued by a troublesome am-
biguity. It is not at all clear what sort of status 
the proposition is supposed to have. On the one hand, 
it might be intended as an ontological claim. If so, 
(7) might be understood to assert the following: 
(7a) 'Brown table' has a veridical use. 
On the other hand, (7) might equally well be intended 
as a grammatical claim. In this case, we might under-
stand (7) to assert: 
(7b) 'Brown table' has a correct use. 
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Note that there is no corresponding ambiguity about 
proposition (8). This proposition is intended (by 
Thomas, at least) as an ontological claim, and may be 
understood as asserting that 'table' has a veridical 
use. 
Now, Thomas proceeds to argue, the extension of 
correctly applied denoting terms may be identical with 
the extension of veridically applied denoting terms, 
but whether there is any such extensional identity is 
a purely contingent matter. For the concept of correct 
linguistic usage is not identical with the concept of 
veridical linguistic usage. Whether or not a term is 
applied correctly depends upon whether it is applied 
in accordance with a given set of syntactic and seman-
tic rules. And whether or not a term is applied 
veridically depends upon whether the object named by 
that term exists. It is always possible, Thomas as-
serts, that we apply our terms in accordance with all 
of the semantic criteria at our disposal (i.e., we 
apply our words correctly), yet fail to apply our words 
veridically. Hence, the truth of (7a) and (8) requires 
the existence of an external world—specifically, the 
existence of brown tables; the truth of (7b) does not. 
It is clear, Thomas argues, that (7a) entails (8), and 
equally clear that (7b) does n o t — f o r it may be true 
that 'brown table* has a correct use, but false that 
'table' has a veridical use. 
When Doubting Thomas appeals to the principle of 
demonstration, and argues that a person cannot know (7) 
without knowing (8), he (Thomas) is claiming that a 
person cannot know (7a) without knowing (8)—that is, 
assuming that he knows that the entailment holds. 
Thomas' reason for appealing to the entailment is under-
standable: he wants to argue that we cannot know that 
brown tables exist unless we know that tables exist. 
On the other hand, to deny the principle of demon-
stration, (in this case, to argue that someone can know 
(7) without knowing (8), even granting that they know 
the entailment holds), seems to amount to a claim that 
a person can know (7b) without knowing (8). If, after 
all, we should be asked to justify Ivan's knowing (7), 
what would count as a justification is not immediately 
obvious. If we responded by pointing out that Ivan 
knows what 'brown' means, or that Ivan has the appropri-
ate criteria for applying 'brown', Thomas might under-
standably argue that we have merely justified Ivan's 
knowing that 'brown table' has a correct use; for under 
the circumstances, we have said nothingwhich would 
justify Ivan's knowing that 'brown table' has a veridical 
use. 
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Thomas* position, then, is that his skeptical chal-
lenge is unscathed by Dretske's line of argument. For 
one can, at best, support only the thesis that a person 
can know that 'brown table' has a correct use without 
knowing whether 'table' has a veridical use. Thomas is 
willing to grant this argument, because he is quite 
willing to allow us knowledge about correct linguistic 
usage. But his argument, he points out, is irrelevant 
to the principle of demonstration, since (7b) does not 
entail (8). 
When Doubting Thomas argues that we cannot know 
(7) , and know that (7) entails (8) , without knowing (8) , 
he is actually arguing that we cannot know (7a) without 
knowing (8). This is why it is so important to him to 
appeal to the entailment between (7)—or rather, (7a) 
— a n d (8) . The reason we cannot know (7) , on Thomas* 
account, is identical with the reason we cannot know 
(8)—we cannot, he thinks, know that an external world 
exists. If this were not Thomas' thesis, then it would 
be quite beside the point to appeal to any entailment 
between (7) and (8) , for our knowledge (or lack of 
knowledge) about correct linguistic usage, on Thomas' 
account, is irrelevant to our knowledge (or lack of 
knowledge) about veridical linguistic usage. Thomas, 
then, is likely to view Dretske's line of argument as 
a non sequitur to his skeptical challenge. 
I do not suppose that Doubting Thomas will have 
an easy task in trying to defend his skeptical thesis. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that whatever problems 
Thomas might have, he need not be troubled by the sort 
of argument levelled by Dretske. 
Syracuse University 
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1See, for example, Fred I. Dretske, "Epistemic 
Operators," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXVII, No. 24 
(Dec. 24, 1970), pp. 1007-23; and Elizabeth H. Wolgast, 
"Knowing and What It Implies," Philosophical Review, 
Vol. LXXX, No. 3 (July, 1971), pp. 360-70. 
2Ibid. 
3E.g., Wolgast, ibid. In what follows, I shall 
address myself only to Dretske's papers the force of 
my comments, however, will apply equally well to Wol-
gast, and any other philosophers who have adopted 
Dretske's line of argument. 
4 
Keith S. Donnellan, "Reference and Definite 
Descriptions," Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXV, No. 3 
(July, 1966) , pp. 281-304. 
5 
Let us suppose that Doubting Thomas' reason for 
claiming that Ivan does not know (8) is as follows: 
(8) entails a further proposition, viz., "There is no 
evil genius who is causing me to have false beliefs 
that material objects exist." Thus, Thomas argues, 
assuming that Ivan knows that (8) entails this latter 
proposition, he cannot know (8) unless he knows the 
latter proposition; and Ivan cannot know the latter 
proposition. 
**Of course, this is not the only method of dealing 
with such a skeptical challenge. One could always argue, 
e.g., that (8) cannot be known simply because it fails to 
express a legitimate proposition. I am not, here, in-
terested in such a reply, mainly because it bypasses 
the principal point of my paper, viz., that whatever 
difficulties a skeptic might have in denying any knowl-
edge of an external world, his challenge is nevertheless 
unaffected by the sort of argument levelled by Dretske. 
Moreover, it is not so clear to me that (8) does not 
have an intelligible meaning simply because it does not 
have an established use in normal discourse. Cf. John 
R. Searle, Speech Acts (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), pp. 141-6 ff. 
